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Virginia court has had -a little less trouble with this principle than
with its apparent double. State v. Legg, supra, which deals directly
with this point holds: "The testimony of a witness upon a preliminary
examination of one accused of a crime may be used by the witness
upon trial of such accused person for the purpose of refreshing his
memory." Usage of -the concept of present recollection revived is
further ,bolstered in West Virginia by -a succession of cases dealing
with 'books of original entry. State v. Larue, 98 W. Va. 667, 691,
128 S.E. 116 (1925); Architects & Builders v. Stewart, 68 W. Va.
506, 70 S.E. 113 (1911). Similarly, a case allowing the testimony
of a nurse, who 'had refreshed 'her memory as to the number of persons visiting the plaintiff's room by use of the bed chart, was held
proper. Browning v. Hoffman, 90 W. Va. 568, 589, 111 S.E. 492
(1922).
The use of notes by a witness to refresh his memory -immediately
raises the danger of a witness being given a script from which to
testify. The threat of such sharp practice has given rise to inspection
of the notes so used either by opposing counsel or 'by -the trial judge.
3 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 111 (3d ed. 1940). Even so, the process
of refreshing the memory by notes is comparatively unrestricted save
by the use of common sense.
From the cases it would appear that the doctrines of past recollection recorded and present recollection revived are established in
this state in varying degrees. Concerning the latter, there is little
doubt, but some confusion does exist among 'the cases as to past
recollection recorded. As stated before, this doctrine is extremely
useful and instances of its applicability should come readily to mind.
Perhaps a clear affirmation of it by the West Virginia court would be
appropriate some time in the future.
John George Van Meter

Income Tax-Alimony-Payment for Months
Prior to Divorce Decree Not Deductible
In May 1953 while a divorce action was pending, the respondent
and his wife entered into an agreement 'by which the respondent
agreed to pay his wife $30,000 annually in advance beginning in
February of that year. In June an interlocutory divorce decree was
entered, and in September this divorce decree became final. On the
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day that the final divorce decree was -issued, the respondent paid his
wife $20,000 for the months of February through September, commensurate to the terms of their agreement. The respondent subsequently used this amount paid as a deduction from his gross income.
The Tax Court 'held that all payments made to the respondent's wife
were properly deducted from the respondents gross income. Held, in
reversing the Tax Court, that the paying of an aggregate sum after
the issuance of the divorce decree, does not in itself satisfy the
requirement of the code provision which provides that periodic payments made to a wife subsequent to a divorce decree, which is in
discharge of a legal obligation under the decree, shall be includible
in 'the wife's gross income and deductible 'by the husband. The postdecree payments received by the wife allocable to months prior to
the decree were all normal items of maintenance and support, which
were the respondents responsibility as in -allother pre-decree months.
The agreement of May did not effect a change in this situation. An
installment which -wouldnot have been deductible if paid at the time
when it was due, is not made deductible merely because it was paid
at a ,time when it would have been deductible if then due. Commisstoner v. DeWitt, 277 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1960).
The alimony tax problem has 'been a most prolific source of
litigation in recent years. The principle case represents one facet of
the controversy which springs out of the court's interpretation of
INT. REv. CODE of 1939, § 22(k), 23(u). The part of § 22(k)
which is pertinent to this discussion provides that when a -wifereceives
payment made "subsequent to the decree," the payments are to be
includible in the wife's gross income and deductible by the husband.
In § 23 (u), it is provided that the 'husband may deduct any payments
made to his wife within the taxable year which are includible in the
gross income of 'the wife under § 22(k).
The interesting element worthy of comment in he principle case
is the fact that the payments were made subsequent to the divorce
decree, but by relating to months prior to 'the decree, they -were not
deductible. This seems to present an anomalous situation; where,
upon first glance, it would appear that the statute had been complied
with, 'but yet the respondent did not come within the scope of the
statute.
This precise question was passed on in Warley v. McMahon,
148 F. Supp. 388 (S.D. N.Y. 1957). This case involves substantially
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the same facts as those of ,the principle case. The petitioner, pursuant
to a separation agreement, made payments to his -wife, subsequent to
the decree, -butthey referred to months prior to the decree. In holding
the payments not deductible the court said that when the code speaks
of payments received subsequent to -the decree it is referring to only
those months -following the decree.
There appears to be a paucity of cases dealing direotly with
this question. There are, however, analogous cases which seem to
be in accord with the mood of the principal case. These cases deal
with the situation where payments were made for months prior to the
decree 'but not subsequent -to it. These were held not deductible
because the allowance of a deduction under this statute is completely
predicated upon the existence of a decree of divorce or of separate
maintenance. Smith v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 446 (2d CiE. 1948);
George Wick, 7 T.C. 723 (1946).
To follow this reasoning, the payments in the principal case for
the months of February through September could not be dependent
on -any decree because the decree -was not entered until September.
Where no decree of divorce or of separate maintenance has been
entered but payments are made to a wife commensurate to some
agreement between the parties, they will not constitute income to her.
Smith v. Commissioner, supra; Dalne v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d
449 (2d Cir. 1948).
Thus it may be concluded that when the respondent made the
payments -for the months of February through September, they could
not have 'been deducted from his gross income. A non-deductible
payment should not be transformed into a deductible payment merely
because it is received in a lump sum subsequent to the decree. Warley
v. McMahon, 148 F. Supp. 388 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
To allow a deduction for payments relating to months prior to
a divorce decree, would in effect be an attempt to make the decree
retroactive to the month the payments began. The decree would be
similar to a decree rendered nunc pro tunc reverting to February. If
this is true it would be in accord with the rationale of the preceeding
authorities, and a deduction may 'be allowed. Unfortunately, retroactive judgments do not determine the rights of -the federal government under its tax laws. Daine v. Commissioner, supra.
On 'the basis of the preceeding authorities, it would appear that
the court reached a practical and realistic conclusion which carried
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out the intention of Congress. Judge Waterman, however in his
dissenting opinion resolves the question of the meaning of the phrase
"subsequent to the decree" by stating that it means any payment
made after there has been adequate proof of a duty to pay arising out
of a divorce decree.
Arthur Mark Recht

Perpetuities-Interests Subject to the Rule-Equitable Interests
The grantor, conveying land fronting on a highway, covenanted
that in the event of the highway being relocated, additional land would
be conveyed to the grantee -without further cost so that the land
presently conveyed would continue to front on the highway. The
deed was recorded. By action of the State Road Commissioner the
highway was relocated. In an action for specific performance of the
covenant, the trial court granted the relief prayed for and the covenantor appealed. Held, upon delivery of the deed containing the covenant, the grantee therein 'became immediately vested with equitable
rights or interests in the parcels of land to which the covenant related
and that the rule against perpetuities has no application to such vested
interests. The interest in or claim acquired by the grantee was held
to be "conveyable," "vendable," and "alienable," within the meaning
of a statute authorizing the conveyance of any interest in or claim
to real estate, and hence not in violation of the rule against perpetuities. Greco v. Meadow River Coal & Land Co., 113 S.E. 2d 79
(W. Va. 1960).
The significant point of this case, apparently unique in regard
to its particular facts, is the presentation at the outset of the validity
of a covenant to convey realty. The decision, it seems, fails to dispel
the confusion that permeates the case in regard to the application of
the rule against perpetuities to contracts which create "rights" or
"interests" in property.
The rule against perpetuities is stated by Professor Gray as
follows: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later
than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the
interest." GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed.
1942). If by any possibility, even a remote one, an interest might
vest beyond the prescribed period, the interest is void. It is not
necessary that the interest will actually vest but -itis necessary to show
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